The news that two more soldiers have died has once again brought home the cost of the Dutch presence in Afghanistan, Giles Scott-Smith writes on TheHollandBureau.com.

The news that two more soldiers have died from an IED last Saturday has once again painfully brought home the continuing Dutch presence in Afghanistan, regardless of cabinets falling and mandates ending for the mission this year. The total number of Dutch fatalities in Afghanistan now stands at 23.
What has the four-year presence in the province of Uruzgan reached, and where is the province heading therefter? The NRC announced on Saturday that the current head of the Chora district, Mohammed Daoud, a close political ally of the Dutch, will leave the region once the Dutch depart. It will be too dangerous for him to remain in place. Old divisions between tribes are rising to the surface again as the departure date for the Dutch approaches.
Daoud followed his father, Rozi Khan, in this position when Khan was accidentally killed by Australian troops in 2008. But the power behind the scenes in this area has remained Jan Mohammed Khan, the regional governor who was removed from his post by Karzai in 2006. The Dutch wanted him out of the way so that they could have a serious chance of improving the quality and effectiveness of governance in Uruzgan. Daoud and his father were the kind of leaders who were brought in to fill this gap.
But Jan Mohammed Khan has never been absent. What is more, he epitomises the problematic double-headed set-up of the Afghan situation. While the US has pursued the anti-terrorist anti-Taliban cause, the NATO-led, UN-mandated ISAF has combined security operations with raising socio-economic development and political stability.
Leaders such as JMK have been very useful for the US forces but more than an annoyance for the development-minded Dutch. His nephew, Matiullah, runs a militia that has sided with the US in its ‘anti-Taliban’ operations. The fact that Matiullah’s forces were doing this largely to justify violence for settling old scores and dominating the local scene was conveniently overlooked. With the Dutch departure approaching, and the likelihood of the US returning to run the region, JMK and Matiullah are looking ahead.
The departure is exposing this Dutch Dilemma, but it would have happened sooner or later. The Dutch approach was aimed at removing these inter-tribal conflicts by slowly building an effective governance structure with posts filled on merit not family background. In this way JMK had to make way for a forward-looking, dare I say modern political system that would bypass local rivalries and overcome tensions by delivering a better standard of living for all. Leaving aside the minefield termed ‘cultural difference’, the motives are basically sound. The problem comes when you try and achieve this in four years, or five, or whatever. This takes several generations to succeed.
The Dutch mission has achieved a lot in Uruzgan. Joeri Boom has covered the scene in two recent articles in the Groene Amsterdammer (‘What do we leave behind in Uruzgan?’) in real depth. Boom shows the effects: 25 million Euro invested in the asphalt road between Tarin Kowt and the Chora district that will improve trade; young girls going to school; an increase in womens’ involvement in local administration; 212 working schools in the province, as opposed to 127 in 2007; an improvement in health provision. It is an impressive picture, not to be denied. The problem comes with the expectation that this can come together and stay together in such a short period of time.
And basing a new system on merit is fine, if those individuals who fit the bill are available. The provincial police chief Juma Gul is a fine example. At first it looked as if he was the perfect choice, overcoming inter-tribal rivalries for the important post. But Gul has instead turned out to be a master of corruption, taking not from the locals but from his own personnel. Including stealing their pensions if they are killed. And in the background behind Gul is, once again, the figure of JMK.
Joeri Boom is realistic: the results are noticeable, but so is the future. Matiullah Khan is fast becoming indispensable as he provides militia forces to protect ISAF and US supply convoys through Uruzgan to Kandahar province. $1700 per truck.
Even the Dutch pay for this service, via a sub-contractor to avoid direct association. Matiullah was first in line – with a contract worth $200,000 – for protecting the construction of the Tarin Kowt – Chora road, but his suspect record ruled him out for the Dutch, who instead ended up with the Asia Security Group, a motley crew of locals. Sections of the road are now in the hands of whoever is the local boss.
Matiullah’s advantage is that he overcomes these local divisions and provides security – but not in a way that the Dutch appreciate. But with JMK a close friend of Karzai, and Karzai – if he stays straight enough – brazenly manoeuvering his way towards some kind of post-NATO future – this is a sign of the what is to come.
TheHollandBureau.com